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Operation Rescue: 
What Legacy of Disobedience? 
by 
The Rev. Qonald F. Haggerty 
The author is a priest of the Archdiocese of New York, ordained by John Cardinal 
O'Connor in 1989. He is presently doing a doctoral dissertation on Jacques 
Maritain at the Accademia Alfonsia in Rome. 
On January 13, 1993 the United States Supreme Court overturned a lower 
court decision allowing the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, enacted to protect blacks 
against conspiracies violating their civil rights, to be applied to the blockading of 
abortion clinics by Operation Rescue. While the anti-Klan law was a protection 
against organized hatred directed at blacks as a race, Justice Antonin Scalia's 
majority opinion in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic rejected the 
notion that efforts to impede aborton were equivalent to animosity against the 
class of women. 
Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and 
respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred or condescension toward (or 
indeed any view at all concerning) women as a class. 
In a season with little to cheer, abortion opponents were understandably 
heartened by the Supreme Court's rejection of the anti-Klan law as a basis for 
prosecuting Operation Rescue. The next day the New York Times quoted the 
executive director of Operation Rescue, Keith Tucci, who recognized a moral 
victory, a "message to our troops," in the Supreme Court decision. The Court's 
action, in the mind of Tucci, invited a broader interpretation than simply the 
refusal to read into a civil rights law a purpose far outside its original intent. It 
could be construed as tacit consent to the aims of Operation Rescue. "What this 
decision tells people is that it is perfectly legal to protest the killing of unborn 
babies." A Court showing no likelihood now to overturn Roe v. Wade at least 
would tolerate the most radical public stance against legalized abortion. 
But perhaps concern for legal status or symbolic victory is a bit short-sighted. 
The actual text of Justice Scalia's opinion cannot be said to include any 
endorsement of Operation Rescue and simply invites the States to apply their 
own laws against trespass of private property. The same New York Times article 
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that quoted Keith Tucci concerned the possible increase in "attacks" on abortion 
clinics as a result of the decision. A lawyer from the Center for Reproductive Law 
and Policy spoke of the decision as "giving license to violence, almost chumming 
for sharks," and she noted ominously "a national pattern of itinerant violence 
against clinics." Other abortion-rights advocates sounded similar warnings of the 
likely rise in violence against clinics and called for Congress to introduce 
legislation making it a federal crime to block access to an abortion clinic. 
It did not take long for Rep. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Constance 
Morella (R-Md.) to oblige, and their bill now before Congress, which President 
Clinton could conceivably sign, includes a first offense punishable by a year 
in prison, with substantial fines, and a second offense punishable by fines 
and three years imprisonment. Despite the recent Supreme Court decision, 
Operation Rescue and its members have for some time been beaten up in the 
courts nationwide. One prominent pro-life attorney John J. Broderick noted 
recently that in trials of rescuersjurors vote for acquital "about once in a hundred 
times." Even without a federal law to prosecute Operation Rescue, prison 
sentences and stiff fines are customary now at the local level, and the number of 
active rescuers has dwindled as a result. While the recent Supreme Court decison 
evokes again the note of controversy that has generally surrounded Operation 
Rescue, it is clear that Operation Rescue faces severe obstacles in the days ahead, 
even more so since the killing on March 10th of Dr. David Gunn outside an 
abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida. Perhaps the moment is appropriate to 
question it as a phenomenon of public record. 
Unlike some previous efforts to effect political change through the practice of 
civil disobedience, there has been an element of ambiguity in the public 
perception of Operation Rescue, and probably because the traditional notions of 
civil disobedience never quite applied in the case of Operation Rescue. From 
Ghandi to Martin Luther King, the arousal of public sympathies through civil 
disobedience has been historically connected to a protest against laws which 
deprived liberties. But at this point in American legal history the right to abortion is 
a liberty sustained on constitutional grounds. Precisely that condition makes 
public protest against the abortion law a poor candidate for transmission of the 
symbolic gesture required for the effectiveness of civil disobedience, which 
traditionally evokes a condition of victim hood for the one whose rights and 
liberties are transgressed. 
If, in the United States, the legal status of abortion can be described as a right to 
an action, a permission for a particular choice, it is not a law that reduces a liberty. 
On the contrary, it exalts the freedom of individual choice to an absolute good 
surpassing all others, even life itself. When an abortion clinic is blocked, those 
whose rights are at risk, at least from a legal standpoint, are women who seek an 
abortion. Any limitation ofthat right can be perceived as an attack on liberty, and 
the one whose liberty is so violated becomes the victim. The legal right and the 
defense of liberty join hands in this instance to repel aggression against a helpless 
victim. Police brutalities become justified, court verdicts predictable, and the 
media blatantly one-sided in coverage, because the focus of victimhood rests 
finally on the woman denied her liberty. She provokes an image of vulnerability, 
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isolated and utterly outnumbered by the crowds of Operation Rescue, attracting 
counter-forces to her own rescue. 
In their dissenting opinions to Bray v. Alexandria Women 's Health Clinic, 
Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor employed precisely the 
notion of rising to the defense of violated rights in the face of a monolithic threat 
to liberty. The language of sentiment is possible here because an image of 
helplessness has attached itself to the woman seeking abortion, which evokes in 
turn a need to denounce, even in exaggerated terms, the presence of grave 
dangers. Even more than the appeal of aiding the "underdog," a woman in 
distress calls forth the traditional stance of heroic and timely rescue. And so 
Justice Stevens speaks of "nationwide conspiracy . .. zealous, politically 
motivated, lawless conduct ... massive defiance of the law with violent 
obstruction of the constitutional rights of their fellow citizens . . . the theft of their 
constitutional rights by organized and violent mobs across the country." Justice 
O'Connor's more sober statements nevertheless include references to women 
desiring abortion as "victims of petitioners' tortious actions," confronting "force, 
intimidation and violence" from those who "have chosen to target women 
seeking abortions and to prevent them from exercising their equal rights under 
the law." 
Keith Tucci, in his New York Times statement, spoke of the Supreme Court 
decision as a "message to our troops." Beyond the rhetorical flourish the 
opportunity presented, the question may be asked whether Tucci was revealing 
the self-understood purpose of Operation Rescue in a militant call to protest, and 
so perhaps inviting the image these dissenting opinions assigned to Operation 
Rescue. At the same time have there been deeper dimensions to this protest, 
beyond the political realm, that justified it in ways not so well understood from 
the purely legal standpoint? Has Operation Rescue sought primarily a political 
objective - namely, the reversal of Roe v. Wade - which at present, since Casey 
v. Planned Parenthood in the summer of 1992, might require at least a 
nationwide conspiracy to overturn? Or is it possible that there were deeper 
meanings at work in Operation Rescue that may have gone unnoticed? How 
would Operation Rescue itself answer charges of violence, conspiracy and 
victimization which intelligent minds identify with it? 
Though the actual graphic drama of large-scale rescues and arrests in Atlanta 
in 1989 and in Wichita, Kansas in 1991 attracted undeniable media interest, it 
seems to be a superficial view that Operation Rescue was seeking as first aim to 
gain public attention. Symbolic gesture trivializes the actual intention of an 
Operation Rescue, which took place far more often on a local level beyond the 
glare of national media focus. As a grass-roots movement the members of 
Operation Rescue described it simply as an organized effort to block access to 
abortion clinics on specific days with the aim of preventing the killing of any child 
in that particular building that day. The goal was to prevent death from taking 
place, even a single death if possible. Rather than dissipating the intensity of that 
primary fact, there was an immediacy offocus precisely upon the near proximity 
of potential killing. Such was its declared purpose - to save children's lives, no 
more and no less - and its tactics followed suit. Whatever was necessary to close 
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down a clinic for that day and so prevent the killing, chaining bodies to doors, for 
instance, or overwhelming doors with bodies, was a defensible means of action 
- anything short of violent action against another person. Blockading an 
abortion clinic was not the time or place for diplomatic discussion of the 
philosophical arguments. 
Yet what else of significance was occurring as a result of such action, especially 
when it took place locally and unknown to the clinic until the day of the 
blockade? By obstructing access to a building, Operation Rescue obliterated, for 
the moment, the constitutional right a mother possesses to destroy the child of her 
womb. Any woman desiring an abortion who approached a blocked clinic 
confronted an unforeseen event with repercussions beyond her immediate 
consciousness. Her prior decision, as a mother, presumably deliberated upon in 
earnest, was stonewalled. She did not lose the capacity to judge solely by herself 
on the worth of the life in her womb, but the ability to carry out a judgment to kill 
that life was forcibly paralyzed. Without her consultation, with no advance 
notice, the death sentence she had already pronounced in the privacy of her 
heart was overturned, and the reprieve not only rendered her judgment null and 
ineffective, it subjected it at least temporarily to an interrogation now directed at 
herself. 
A successful Operation Rescue thus caused a rupture between the autonomy 
of private judgment and the freedom of a right proclaimed by society. The 
decisiveness of a judgment made in the privacy of conscience was denied access 
to a right deemed legal in the public domain. Prevented by the blockade, a 
mother's private intention could not translate itself into action, and this inability 
to carry out her decision undermined a power she could assume she possessed 
until then. Instead, the presumed correctness of a woman's choice, resting on a 
right society had sanctioned, to decide for herself the fate of her child, was cast 
back upon the mother emptied of its former claim to absolute independence. Her 
autonomy, at least for the moment, became a cruel fiction. 
No one would deny there was something quite aggressive in this action of 
forcibly seizing a putative legal right from another and in effect declaring it no 
right at all. Blockading a clinic tore from the legal right its normal vitality to issue 
in action. But to affirm the right to life of a child, members of Operation Rescue 
saw, in conscience, no alternative but to repudiate the legal right granted by a 
legal decision. No compromise on the matter could be permitted. And perhaps 
the action was expressing precisely the dilemma of a radical moral stance in the 
postmodern world, since morality and legality claim, in this instance oflegalized 
abortion, to uphold rights that are in direct conflict. Moral rights bound to life 
itself and legal rights framed to meet current social pressures find no common 
ground here. 
Yet one might say these were merely legal aspects of the effort taken by 
Operation Rescue to oppose abortion. To appreciate the deeper philosophical 
undercurrent at work in Operation Rescue's protest, it may be necessary to grasp 
a largely overlooked facet in the acceptance of abortion by American society in 
the years since Roe v. Wade in 1973. Although the public debate over abortion is 
ordinarily cast as a conflict of rights between a woman in her self-autonomy and 
November, 1993 53 
the unborn child's right to life, an underlying foundation for the acceptance of 
legalized abortion has been ignored, and it was perhaps Operation Rescue which 
unwittingly made the point in dramatic fashion. 
No abortion-related decision or opinion of a Justice since Roe v. Wade has 
formally denied the reality of life in the fetus, only the right to life of the unborn 
child. But the significance of a baby's existence to the self-understanding of a 
pregnant woman has never been addressed in these years, except to reinforce the 
notion of a child as an unwanted burden or a threat to a woman's sovereignty 
over her own body. The unspoken implication necessary to justify abortion was 
to leave aside the question whether the life to be terminated did not touch the 
maternal instinct in a profound manner prior to birth, so much so that violation of 
that instinct through directly intending the destruction of her own child might do 
irreparable damage to the spiritual well-being of a mother. 
This insidious attack on the true nature of the feminine maternal instinct 
occurred through an assault on the natural union between a mother and her child. 
Indeed a guiding principle for the Supreme Court Justices who have defended 
Roe's continuance has been to underscore the ambiguous status of the unborn 
child, withdrawing the child from a fundamental connection to the mother, and 
thereby isolating the unborn as an entity of uncertain abstract meaning. The 
ground was laid when Roe v. Wade, concerned for the private decision of the 
mother, refused the "fetus" the constitutional protections associated with legal 
personhood, since the fetus as person would implicate any direct assault upon its 
life. Person, according to that decision, is a word that "has application only 
postnatally." The decisive importance ofthat legal maneuver is telling for all that 
follows. 
If the notion of legal personhood determines who is a subject of rights, the 
denial of personhood for the unborn child led soon enough to the conclusion that 
any consideration of human life in the unborn child obscures the more pertinent 
matter of the actual absence of legal rights for that life. Empirical fact, scientific 
evidence, are permitted no direct input here. The only relevant fact is that there 
can be no "significant" life where no legal right persists. Almost twenty years after 
Roe, Justice Stevens was simply reiterating a firmly entrenched position of the 
Court when his opinion to Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992) noted the legal 
consequence of the unborn child lacking the status of personhood: 
A developing organism that is not yet a 'person' does not have what is sometimes 
described as a 'right to life.' 
A process of abstraction was thus begun with Roe v. Wade that proved a 
methodology for the defense of abortion rights. Dissolving the unborn child into 
a mere idea with a rival claim to a right that encroached on a woman's private 
choice encouraged further confusions beyond the cut-and-dried world of legal 
decisions. The isolation of the unborn child as an abstraction relative to the 
mother's private autonomy was the preparation for muddling the scientific and 
philosophical orders. Recognition of the existence of human life in the unborn, a 
scientific question, became tied in the views of some Justices to the metaphysical 
problem of personhood residing in human life prior to birth, indeed, from the 
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moment of conception. 
And so by Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (1986), in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, the 
presumption that an unborn child could be a human being had itself become a 
religious question, a notion to be placed alongside the consideration whether the 
fetus was a person. The Court had already rejected legal personhood for the fetus, 
now it could feel free, according to Stevens, to extend a flat-out denial to the 
existence of human life in the fetus, a question apparently no longer outside the 
Court's competence, since it was clear by now, at least to Stevens, that the 
absence oflegal personhood, begun with Roe, deprived the unborn child equally 
of scientific and philosophical status as well. 
For, unless the religious view that a fetus is a 'person' is adopted . . . there is a fundamental 
and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not 
such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left 
to the will of the state legislatures. 
The necessity in the view of Justice Stevens to expel from the Court any hint of 
metaphysical regard in its deliberations, while actually in effect pronouncing 
answers of philosophical import, led finally in Casey v. Planned Parenthood 
(1992) to the unseemly exaltation of self-autonomy as an abstraction upon which 
the Court could at last stake a metaphysical commitment. Liberty now was 
equated with an autonomous right of definition, not simply about private 
decisions "basic to individual dignity and autonomy," not simply concerning a 
"certain private sphere of individual liberty," as Thornburgh had said, but 
concerning the nature of the basic truths of human life. 
At the heart ofliberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Truth thus depends solely on its being determined as such by whoever chooses to 
do so, and most especially, one would expect, when the matter concerns "the 
right," as Justice Blackmun had already written in dissenting from Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services Inc. in 1989, "to make the uniquely personal, 
intimate and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy." 
How did Operation Rescue speak directly to the underlying philosophical bias 
expressed in the Supreme Court's progressive reduction of the meaning of an 
unborn child? If the individual's right of self-definition has become, according to 
Casey, the cornerstone of the defense of abortion rights, how did Operation 
Rescue cast light on the significance of a pregnant mother defining herself apart 
from the presence of the baby in her womb? The answers perhaps lie in the effect 
of a "rescue" upon the maternal instinct of a woman. 
When members of Operation Rescue were arrested, it was generally for 
placing their own bodies in between that of the mother and a clinic, protecting a 
child from its potential murder inside that building. Far from being passive, this 
aggressive action announced in forthright terms that the inconvenience of a 
pregnancy could not be expediently done away with. But there was more than a 
denial of the legal right in this action, or of the more ethereal philosophicai 
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capacity for self-definition. Blocking access to an abortion clinic affirmed a 
woman's motherhood, and the real existence of the child she carried, in a manner 
that no moral debate could match. How so? 
While the principal strategy of an Operation Rescue has been this use of a 
blockade, what that blockade never did was separate a child from his or her 
mother. On the contrary, any mother impeded from entering a clinic was forced, 
willingly or not, to gaze back self-reflexively upon her own motherhood and the 
inner conflict created in her heart by legalized abortion. It is true that on the level 
of argument her own child's right to continuing existence remained at odds with 
the legal right she possessed, as a mother, to abort that child. But this conflict was 
more than one of abstract legal rights. Two opposing experiences of subjectivity 
were at war in the heart of a mother contemplating an abortion, and her attempt 
to gain entrance to the abortion clinic blocked by Operation Rescue bared this 
self-contradiction. 
What was truly exposed here was the awful capacity of the human heart to 
retain diametrically opposed interior states. A mother, because she is a mother, 
cannot help but carry within her the instinct of a mother's nature to preserve her 
baby from harm. And yet simultaneously she can surrender to the desire for 
self-autonomy which an abortion will, for the moment, guarantee. The sanction 
of law offers a possibility that contradicts the natural instinct, and indeed it 
encourages just such a step. But the law cannot overcome an instinct rooted in 
nature any more than a mother can eradicate the law of nature through an act of 
violence against herself. By appealing to the subjective desire for self-autonomy, 
the seductive presence oflegal right may temporarily blur and confuse the natural 
instinct, block it even, but it cannot banish entirely a mother's protective instinct 
toward her own infant. And it is precisely such depths of feeling for the reality of 
her own child's existence which Operation Rescue forced upon a mother. 
When the blockade of a clinic by Operation Rescue restored the right to live, at 
least for the moment, of the child whose life hung precariously in the balance, 
more than a test of conflicting freedoms thus weighed in the balance. A 
metaphysical victory was taking place. There was an implicit statement in a 
successful blockade that the transcendent value of life does not submit to the 
immanence of autonomous self-will. That a child, simply because it is a child, 
should remain alive, triumphed over the notion that arbitrary willfulness should 
have power over life. Every legalistic ingenuity to transform a baby into a mere 
abstraction of public controversy over the rights of self-autonomy became 
exposed as a lie preparing the ground for a naked evil. Unwilling to submit to 
society's dispatch of the unborn child as a mere disposable item on the agenda of 
autonomous rights, Operation Rescue insisted on a metaphysical vindication of 
the personhood of the baby in the womb, and so restored to a mother the chance 
to embrace again the beauty and the dignity of her own motherhood. 
Before Casey v. Planned Parenthood in 1992, the majority opinions of the 
Supreme Court were inclined to subsume questions of personhood and the 
existence of human life under a category of the unanswerable. The newfound 
realization in the 1992 ruling is that private liberty and its self-defining capacity 
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provide the elixir for all such questions. Shedding its customary reluctance for 
broaching metaphysical matters, the Court in the summer of 1992 waxed 
eloquent in encouraging what amounts to the individual's private presumption of 
reaching moral certitude simply because decision-making is inherently self-
justifying. Instead of demanding hard reasoned judgment, the Casey decision 
implies that moral praxis means to be guided by predilections arising out of the 
individual's own desires, requiring only the ability to convince oneself of an 
outstanding personal need of the moment. 
Casey's notion of liberty is thus a barely disguised brand of the modern faith 
acceptable to a world without reference to God. For liberty of this sort proposes a 
belief in the self as isolated in its own infallible will to self-definition. The 
pretension of attaining a metaphysical high ground in this rooting of liberty in a 
principle of moral self-autonomy should not be missed. Perhaps without so 
intending, Justice Scalia's criticism of the judicial methodology of the majority 
decision in Casey is equally a blunt statement on the consequences to personal 
morality when self-autonomy is the one defensible absolute. 
It is not reasoned judgment that supports the court's decision; only personal predilection 
. . . what the court calls 'reasoned judgment' . .. turns out to be nothing but 
philosophical predilection and moral intuition. 
In a statement of unintended self-disclosure on the spiritual state of a nation, 
this same Casey decision ominously asserts that "an entire generation has come of 
age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty." Perhaps in the wake of the Court's 
endorsement of such dubious notions of liberty, Operation Rescue can be seen 
now as all along offering something of a test case for the loss of critical 
intelligibility in contemporary moral understanding. Perhaps not fully aware 
even of its own implications, Operation Rescue laid bare the fragile survival of 
truth in an arena of conflict where antiseptic abstractions have too long directed 
the course of arguments. The result has been a gradual numbing of the moral 
conscience of the nation, which should be no surprise. An anesthetized 
conscience is a likely consequence when the choice of evil is made easier by 
rationalized motives. 
The Supreme Court's defense of abortion rights is partially to blame in this 
regard. By adopting over the years an unnatural logic that splits mother and child 
into abstract entities having no basis in flesh and blood, the Court has desensitized 
the American conscience about the reality of abortion. With the reaffirmation by 
Casey of the constitutional right to abortion, a woman's sense of personal 
freedom can declare even more firmly her triumph over disposable tissue. But 
such a victory involves far more than indulging oneself in a grandiose notion of 
liberty. A betrayal of reality is also necessary, for a baby in the womb is not a 
concept, a mere thought, and a mother's lie to herself undergirds the refusal to 
protect the life of her unborn child. 
Operation Rescue's aggressive methods were a metaphysical protest against 
that lie, a rebellion directed at the reign of abstractions which violate the actual 
truths of motherhood. Civil disobedience is thus an incomplete description for 
the illegal actions of Operation Rescue. What was really taking place was a 
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"metaphysical disobedience" against a philosophy of autonomous liberty now 
enshrined in a Supreme Court ruling. The doors of an abortion clinic were the 
portals of death in more ways than one, and there was no choice but to close 
them. 
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